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In the 1930s, Carnap set out to incorporate psychology into the unity of science, by showing that
all cognitively meaningful sentences of psychology can be translated into the language of physics. I
will argue that Carnap, relying on his notion of protocol languages, defends a physicalistic philos-
ophy of psychology that shows due appreciation of introspection as a strictly subjective, but reliable
way to verify sentences about ones own mind. Second, I will point out that Carnaps philosophy of
psychology not only takes into account overt behaviour, but must comprise neurophysiological pro-
cesses as well. Last, I will show that Carnap aims to develop a philosophy of psychology that does
justice to the ongoing changeability of scientiﬁc knowledge.
 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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In the early 1930s, several members of the Vienna Circle applied their uniﬁed science
project to the philosophy of psychology. The result of this application came to be known
as logical behaviourism.1 According to Carnap and Neurath, the logical empiricist project
of uniﬁed science could only be realized by means of a philosophical programme termed0039-3681/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2005.08.004
E-mail address: A.M.Tamminga@rug.nl (A. Tamminga)
1 The term was coined by Hempel (1949 [1935]), p. 381. Carnap cites Hempels term as he quotes a passage from
the unpublished German manuscript of Hempels article in Carnap (1932), p. 187.
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brief discussion of the neo-positivistss global empiricist programme, since we would miss
the crux of their philosophy of psychology by treating it as an isolated position.
As we know, the neo-positivists aimed to rid the language that we use to formulate our
knowledge of all cognitively meaningless elements, in order to curb the knowledge claims
of metaphysicians and other philosophists once and for all: on closer inspection, their
claims would turn out to be cognitively meaningless. In drawing up a criterion for cogni-
tive meaningfulness, the Viennese philosophers relied on the theory of meaning of the early
Wittgenstein, who noted in his Tractatus: To understand a proposition means to know
what is the case if it is true (4.024). The neo-positivists reformulated Wittgensteins theory
of meaning into a criterion for cognitive meaningfulness. In an early version their criterion
was roughly as follows: a sentence is cognitively meaningful if and only if that sentence
implies a non-empty set of sentences that state an elementary experience. Bona ﬁde scien-
tiﬁc statements simply should be able to pass this cognitive meaningfulness test, regardless
of the scientiﬁc discipline to which they belong. In short, whether they stem from physics
or from psychology, cognitively meaningful statements should always be conﬁrmed in the
same intersubjective manner:
Unity of science . . . means essentially a unity of the conﬁrmation basis of all factu-2 Seeally cognitive (i.e., non-analytic) statements of the natural and the social sciences.
(Feigl, 1963, p. 227)After several attempts at formulating a sound criterion for cognitive meaningfulness were
seen to have problematic consequences, Carnap tried to counter these problems by means
of a universal and intersubjective system language, into which precisely all cognitively
meaningful statements could be translated. This universal and intersubjective system lan-
guage, Carnap argued in his Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissens-
chaft (Carnap, 1995 [1931]), is the physicalistic language, the language of physics.
The neo-positivist programme of a physicalization of psychology was, ﬁrst, a contri-
bution to the debate on the supposedly essential diﬀerences between the sciences (Natur-
wissenschaften) and the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften).2 This topic had been hotly
debated in German philosophy since the 1890s. Dilthey and others held that the sciences
and the humanities diﬀered fundamentally and that, just as mechanics were considered as
the basis of the sciences, so psychology had to be seen as the foundation of the human-
ities. A succesful physicalization of psychology would show such a position to be
untenable.
Second, a successful physicalization of psychology would free scientiﬁc psychology from
its precarious epistemological predicament. In his pamphlet Einheitswissenschaft und Psy-
chologie (Neurath, 1987 [1933]), Neurath outlined the awkward position of empirical psy-
chology at the time: every school in the new psychology uses its own terminology, in which
metaphysical expressions keep popping up, in spite of its empirical and sometimes even
explicitly anti-metaphysical aspirations. Four years earlier, Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath
wrote: The linguistic forms which we still use in psychology today have their origin in cer-
tain ancient metaphysical notions of the soul (Carnap, Hahn, & Neurath, 1973 [1929], p.
314). Metaphysical haggling between empirical psychologists talking at cross-purposes was, for instance, Carnap (1995 [1931]), pp. 31–37, and (1963), p. 52.
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psychology should be incorporated into uniﬁed science, or that all sentences of psychology
should be translated into the physicalistic language.
According to Carnap and Neurath, this translation ploy would separate the wheat
from the chaﬀ: cognitively meaningless psychological sentences are exposed as metaphys-
ical word constructions, while for every cognitively meaningful sentence there exists a
translation into the language of physics. Once this philosophical programme has been
successfully completed, not only will the language of psychology be purged of metaphys-
ics, but empirical psychologists of every persuasion will be able to concentrate on a fruit-

















thesisBehaviourists, gestalt psychologists, reﬂexologists, individual psychologists, and psy-
choanalysts will soon see their theories before them in the uniﬁed language of phys-
icalism and will at last be able to compare them successfully. (Neurath, 1987 [1933],
p. 22)The initial enthusiasm with which the members of the Vienna Circle greeted early
American behaviourism3 was somewhat tempered during the 1930s. In 1933, Neurath de-
nounced what, according to him, was the exaggerated opposition of the American behavi-
ourists to inner observation, for it is hard to see why perceptions of our stomachs or
other ‘‘inner’’ structures [Gebilde] should not in principle be just as admissible as the per-
ceptions of our eyes or ears (ibid., p. 16).4 Neurath also condemned the tendency of some
behaviourists to want to infer norms and values from the results of empirical research in
psychology. He pointed out that a possible explanation for this propensity of Watson cum
suis was that American behaviourists resorted to formulations that do not stand up to the
test of physicalistic language criticism.5 Likewise, Carnap regretted that the fundamental
question of behaviourism is often formulated in the material mode of speech as a pseudo-
object-question (e.g. ‘‘Do mental processes exist?’’, ‘‘Is psychology concerned only with
physical behaviour?’’, and so on) (Carnap, 1971 [1934], p. 324).6 In his Analyse logique
de la psychologie (1949 [1935]), Hempel raised a more fundamental objection against1929, Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath emphasized the similarities between the American behaviouristss
phy of psychology and their own position: The attempt of behaviorist psychology to grasp the psychic
h the behavior of bodies, which is at a level accessible to perception, is, in its principled attitude, close to
entiﬁc world-conception (Carnap, Hahn, & Neurath, 1973 [1929], p. 315). However, in his Behaviorism and
positivism, Laurence Smith concludes that the alliance of behaviorism and logical positivism was based
much on genuine intellectual understanding as on relatively superﬁcial convergences of opinion on broad
and on matters of rhetoric and propaganda (Smith, 1986, p. 18).
st logical empiricists considered introspection to be fully compatible with physicalism. See Carnap (1959a
, p. 192; Hempel (1949 [1935]), p. 381; Reichenbach (1970, [1938]), pp. 236–238; Neurath (1983a [1941]),
.
e Viennese neopositivists used the term behaviourism ‘‘in the wider sense’’ to designate their philosophy of
logy. Neurath suggested replacing that term by behaviouristics, so as not to have constantly to justify the
of the American behaviourists (Neurath, 1987 [1933], p. 13). Apparently, only Neurath himself followed
ggestion. See, for instance, Neurath (1983a [1941]), pp. 214, 226.
rnap conceded, though, that if the fundamental question of behaviorism is formulated in the formal mode,
be seen that here again the question is one of reducibility of the psychological concepts; the fundamental
of behaviorism is thus closely allied to that of physicalism (Carnap, 1971 [1934], pp. 324–325).
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istss philosophy of psychology depended on its empirical success.7 Therefore, a more thor-
ough epistemological approach was required. The logical empiricists claimed that the
translation of the languages of psychology into the universal and intersubjective language
of physics would remedy these problems.
The present article proposes a systematic interpretation of the logical behaviourism of
Carnap, who was the ﬁrst logical empiricist to seriously undertake a detailed epistemolog-
ical analysis of psychology. I will argue that in his philosophy of psychology, Carnap
shows due appreciation to introspection as a strictly subjective, but reliable way to verify
sentences about ones own mind. Second, I will point out that Carnaps philosophy of psy-
chology not only takes into account overt behaviour, but must comprise neurophysiologi-
cal processes as well. Last, I will show that Carnap couples full awareness of the
changeability of scientiﬁc knowledge with the aspiration to develop a philosophy of psy-
chology that does justice to this changeability.
In order to illustrate Carnaps positions, I will occasionally draw from the work of
other members of the Vienna Circle. It seems, however, less obvious to try and wrench
a coherent, well-argued philosophy of psychology from the writings of Hempel, Neurath,
or Schlick, because that work is mainly of an introductory or even propagandistic nature.
Feigl is a somewhat special case. His philosophy of psychology was closely related to that
of Carnap during the early 1930s. Later, Feigls views evolved substantially—he moved to
the United States in 1930—and culminated in his 1958 monograph The mental and the
physical one of the benchmarks of twentieth-century philosophy of mind. A review of
Feigls philosophy of psychology is outside the scope of this article, as I will focus mainly
on the philosophy of psychology of the Vienna Circle in the 1930s, and especially on the
articulation and interpretation of Carnaps philosophy of psychology.
2. Carnaps philosophy of psychology
At the basis of Carnaps philosophy of psychology of the 1930s lies the distinction be-
tween system languages and protocol languages. A system language is a language used to
articulate the states of aﬀairs of which a particular science speaks; a protocol language is
the language used by a particular subject S to record his experiences, perceptions, and
feelings, thoughts (Carnap, 1995 [1931], p. 43).8 Carnap thinks that it is necessary for
his epistemological investigations, though practically ineﬀective, to exclude the theory-
laden statements from such a protocol language. Protocol sentences serve as the touch
stone for sentences from a system language. A subject S can test (but never prove!) every
cognitively meaningful sentence p, whether it is general or singular, by checking whether
the protocol sentences that can be derived from p are among the protocol sentences that
the subject S holds true.7 Hempel writes: It seems . . . that the soundness of the behavioristic thesis . . . depends on the possibility of
fulﬁlling the program of behavioristic psychology. But one cannot expect the question as to the scientiﬁc status of
psychology to be settled by empirical research in psychology itself. To achieve this is rather an undertaking in
epistemology (Hempel, 1949 [1935], p. 375). Cf. also Carnap (1959a [1932]), p. 181.
8 Carnap fails to draw a clear distinction between a (formal) language and a theory expressed in that (formal)
language.
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sticks to a subjectivistic and phenomenalistic interpretation of protocol sentences: proto-
col sentences bridge the gap between language and reality because they are the elementary
sentences of the language used by a subject S to articulate the contents of his subjective
experiences. Protocol sentences account for the simple fact, that everybody in testing
any sentence empirically cannot do otherwise than refer ﬁnally to his own observations
(Carnap, 1936, pp. 423–424).9 Protocol languages are subject-dependent, since protocol
languages of various persons are mutually exclusive (Carnap, 1995 [1931], p. 88).10 Car-
nap had long been partisan to such a subjectivistic foundation of meaning and truth,11
though in earlier studies he explicitly acknowledges the possibility of a physicalistic
foundation.12
The content of a system sentence p for a subject S is the set of protocol sentences from
Ss protocol language which follow logically from p, given a suﬃciently large set of already
accepted singular physicalistic sentences, the inference rules of the system language in-
volved, and the laws of nature.13 If no protocol sentence of S can thus be derived from
p, then p is for S a (cognitively) meaningless sentence: [i]n such a case S cannot understand
the statement p, for to ‘‘understand’’ means to know the consequences of p, i.e. to know
the statements of the protocol language which can be deduced from p (Carnap, 1995
[1931], p. 51). Given a group G of subjects S1, . . . ,Sn, a system sentence p is intersubjec-
tively meaningful (intersubjektiv sinnvoll) for G, if the cognitive content of p for every sub-
ject Si in G is not empty. Hence, a system sentence p can be intersubjectively meaningful
even if the non-empty contents which p has for diﬀerent subjects in G do not coincide: one
and the same system sentence p may have diﬀerent contents for diﬀerent subjects.14 A sys-
tem language is intersubjective for G if every sentence in this system language is intersub-
jectively meaningful for G.159 Compare Carnap (1967 [1928]), § 2; Carnap (1987 [1932]), pp. 468–469 and Richardson (1998), p. 24.
10 In his U¨ber Protokollsa¨tze (1987 [1932]), Carnap defends his use of the expressions ones own protocol
sentences and others protocol sentences against Neuraths and Zilsels objections (Carnap, 1987 [1932], p. 463).
On the next page, Carnap even refers to protocol languages as private languages. Compare Carnap (1932), p.
180.
11 In Carnaps early work, which was conceived independently of the Vienna Circle, there are already the seeds
of what, through the constitution theory in Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Carnap, 1967 [1928]), would develop
into the physicalism on a phenomenalistic basis defended by Carnap at the beginning of the 1930s. In his U¨ber
die Aufgabe der Physik (1923), Carnap outlines, as a terminus ad quem for contemporary research, an ideal,
completed physics, consisting of three parts: (a) a set of axioms; (b) a phenomenalistic-physicalistic dictionary; (c)
the description of the physicalistic state of the world at two arbitrary, but diﬀerent moments in time (Carnap,
1923, pp. 96–103). The dictionary should bridge the gap between, on the one hand, the language which contains
the phenomenalistic sentences with which we express the contents of our subjective experiences, and, on the other,
the physicalistic language, which consists of the sentences with which the physicalistic states of aﬀairs are
formulated.
12 See for example Carnap (1967 [1928]), § 59.
13 Note that any subject S can only assess the content of a system sentence p relative to a set of previously
accepted physicalistic sentences. See Carnap (1935), p. 44. The laws of nature are mentioned separately, since, in
the early 1930s, Carnap still considered laws of nature as inference rules rather than as sentences to be used as
premisses in an inference.
14 Let p be a system sentence, p1 and p2 diﬀerent protocol sentences and G = {S1, S2}. If contentS1(p) = {p1} and
contentS2(p) = {p2}, then p is intersubjectively meaningful for G, because the content of p for every subject Si in G
is not empty.
15 Compare Carnap (1995 [1931]), pp. 51, 64.
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of space and time, in accordance with which q may be deduced from p and p from q (Car-
nap, 1959a [1932], p. 166). This deﬁnition implies that if two system sentences p and q are
mutually translatable, then for every subject S the content that p has for S is identical to
the content that q has for S.16 (Note that for each subject the contents of p and q may be
identical, without it being the case that all subjects attach the very same content to p and
















framewThe possibility of such a deduction of protocol sentences constitutes the content of a
sentence. . . . If the same sentences may be deduced from two sentences, the latter two
sentences have the same content. They say the same thing, and may be translated
into one another. (Ibid.)This passage requires some interpretation, since our above considerations showed that the
content of a sentence is always the content of a sentence for a subject S. However, the
quote does not make sense if for only one subject the latter two sentences have the same
content. To see this, suppose that only for one subject S the content of a system sentence
p is identical to the content of a system sentence q. Then it is still possible that the system
sentences in question are not mutually translatable: consider two subjects, S1 and S2, each
with his own protocol language, so that the contents of p and q are identical for S1 but not
for S2. If p and q were mutually translatable, they should have the same content for S1 as
for S2, which in this example is obviously not the case. Hence, to interpret our passage
correctly, we must require that p and q have the same content for every subject S. Sum-
ming up our renderings of Carnaps position on mutual translatability, two system sen-
tences p and q are mutually translatable if and only if for every subject S it holds that the
content which p has for S is identical to the content which q has for S.18
Note that mutual translatability in terms of subject-independent contents implies mu-
tual translatability in terms of subject-dependent contents, but not vice versa. As we shall
see, Carnap needs this weaker form of mutual translatability to account for the diﬀerence
in veriﬁcation procedures for sentences about our own mind and for sentences about other
minds.the system sentences p and q be mutually translatable and let the protocol sentence p from the protocol
ge of subject S follow from p. Then p follows from p and p follows from q. Therefore, p follows from q. So,
writes, translating gehaltgleich with e´quipollent: [i]f two sentences p and q have the same content, i.e.,
tually deducible, then obviously the protocol sentences [e´nonce´s de controˆle] for p are identical to those for
nap, 1935, p. 44). This refutes a claim by Ramon Cirera: the rules of translation (or reduction) that the
ian construction uses do not observe any restriction of analyticity . . . In other words, they do not retain
aning of the sentences, which Carnap called the epistemic value (Erkenntniswert) in the Aufbau, but only
ical value (logische Wert), or the truth value (Cirera, 1993, p. 355).
nsider the following situation, ﬁguring only two subjects, S1 and S2: contentS1(p) = {p1} = contentS1(q),
ontentS2(p) = {p2} = contentS2(q). In this case, it still holds that for every subject S the content that p has
s identical to the content that q has for S.
is interpretation is conﬁrmed by an example given in Carnap (1935), pp. 45–46. Moreover, it solves one of
problems with Carnaps philosophy of psychology: it seems strange to say that a statement has the same
g for A and B when they attach diﬀerent meanings to part of what it states (Ayer, 1963, p. 276). Kim does
en mention subject-dependent protocol languages in his discussion of Carnaps position on translation
2003, p. 273). Hence, Kim fails to notice that Carnap sets out to give an account of introspection within the
ork of a physicalist philosophy of psychology.
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deﬁnition is presented which directly or indirectly (i.e., with the help of other deﬁnitions)
derives that expression from expressions of L2 (Carnap, 1959a [1932], p. 167). A language
is universal if every (cognitively meaningful) sentence from every other language can be
translated into it.
The physicalistic language, by which Carnap means the language of physics, is, as yet,19
constructed from elementary sentences of the type F(x,y,z,t) = [a,b]. Such an elementary
sentence expresses the attribution of a value interval [a,b] to a state quantity F of a
point-instant (x,y,z,t)—for example, The temperature of point-instant (x,y,z,t) lies in
the interval [a,b]. Now that we have become familiar with the conceptual apparatus, we





21 SeeIt will be proved . . . that the physical language is inter-subjective and can serve as a
universal language, i.e. as a language in terms of which all states of aﬀairs could be
expressed. Finally, an attempt will be made to show that the various protocol lan-
guages also can be regarded as partial languages . . . of the physical language. (Car-
nap, 1995 [1931], p. 52)2.1. Psychology in physical language
The central thesis of Carnaps and Neuraths physicalism is that for each cognitively
meaningful sentence in the system language of every special science there can be found
a translation into the intersubjective and universal system language of physics. This obvi-
ously also applies to psychology, whose task will eventually be to describe systematically
the (physical) behavior of living creatures, especially that of human beings, and to devel-
op laws under which this behavior may be subsumed (Carnap, 1959a [1932], p. 189).
Consequently, Carnap argues that a deﬁnition may be constructed for every psycholog-
ical concept (i.e. expression) which directly or indirectly derives that concept from phys-
ical concepts (ibid., p. 167). As a result, all psychological laws could also be expressed
in the physical language, and hence become laws of physics. In spite of his concept
reductionism, Carnap still thinks it is possible—although he would rather put his money
on the opposite—that the physicalistic laws to which the organic domain obeys are not
derivable from the physicalistic laws which apply to the anorganic domain: [t]his ques-
tion of the deducibility of the laws is completely independent of the question of the deﬁn-
ability of concepts (ibid.). Concept reduction does not automatically lead to theory
reduction.20
Furthermore, Carnap explicitly does not consider himself a language reformer. He
does not wish to outlaw the use of all psychological concepts and to replace them with
purely physicalistic concepts.21 Rather, he aims, given our current state of knowledge,
to grasp the cognitive meaning of our psychological concepts as precisely as possiblernap writes: We wish however to interpret the term ‘‘the physical language’’ so widely as to include not
e special linguistic forms of the present merely but also such linguistic forms as physics may use in any
stage of development (Carnap, 1995 [1931], p. 54).
also Carnap, Hahn, & Neurath (1973 [1929]), p. 314; Carnap (1995 [1931]), pp. 69, 97–98; Carnap (1971
, p. 324.
Carnap (1995 [1931]), p. 95.
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icalistic language. According to Carnap, it is possible to bridge the gap between the psy-
chological and the physicalistic language by the subject-dependent protocol languages,
since they are the ultimate basis for assessing the meaning and truth of any system
sentence.
The content of a universal sentence is completely determined by the contents of the
singular sentences that can be deduced from it. Hence, in his logical analysis of psycho-
logical sentences, Carnap may focus, without loss of generality, on the investigation of
singular psychological sentences. These singular sentences attribute a certain quality to a
particular person at a particular moment, such as Yesterday afternoon Mr B was an-
gry. From an epistemological point of view, it is consequential which person utters such
a singular psychological sentence. Hence, Carnap subdivides singular psychological sen-
tences into two classes: sentences about other minds and sentences about ones own
mind.
2.1.1. Sentences about other minds
According to Carnap, a sentence p about an others mind, such as Mr B is angry
now, can only be veriﬁed by deriving it from a universal sentence O expressing a certain
law or regularity and a number of protocol sentences p1, . . . ,pn that formulate observa-
tions about Mr Bs physical state or about his behaviour. (Carnap calls attention to the
non-monotonous character of this type of inference: new protocol sentences can force us
to retract an earlier drawn conclusion that p, for example, when we discover that Mr B is
play-acting.)22 The criterion for cognitive meaningfulness tells us that the content of p
consists of the set of protocol sentences which we can infer from p and a set of physical-
istic sentences, using logic and laws of nature. These protocol sentences can refer only to
our observations of Bs physical state and behaviour. Given Carnaps above-cited claim
that the subject-dependent protocol languages are also translatable into the physicalistic
language, it must for each subject S be possible to exhaustively render the cognitive
meaning of p—Mr B is angry now—by a physicalistic sentence q, that has for every sub-
ject exactly the same content as p. This physicalistic sentence q postulates a physical
structure characterized by the disposition to react in a speciﬁc manner to speciﬁc physical
stimuli. In our example, q asserts the existence of a physical structure (microstructure) of
Mr Bs body (especially of his central nervous system) that is characterized by a high
pulse and rate of breathing, which, on the application of certain stimuli, may even be
made higher, by vehement and factually unsatisfactory answers to questions, by the
occurrence of agitated movements on the application of certain stimuli, etc. (Carnap,
1959a [1932], p. 172).
According to the criterion for cognitive meaningfulness, it must be possible to translate
without remainder all psychological sentences about an others mind into the language of
physics. For, if we were to reject the principled possibility of translating our sentence p, via
the set of protocol sentences deducible from p, into a physicalistic sentence q, then p would
immediately degenerate into a metaphysical pseudo-sentence. Thus Feigl writes in his The
psychophysical problem (1934): To ascribe to our fellow men consciousness in addition to22 Cf. Hempel (1949 [1935]), p. 379. Compare Ayer (1963), pp. 277–278.
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introduction of empirically unveriﬁable elements (Feigl, 1934, p. 424).23
2.1.2. Sentences about ones own mind
The use of the notion of a subject-dependent protocol language allows Carnap to ac-
count for the putative asymmetry between veriﬁcation procedures for sentences about
other minds and those for sentences about ones own mind: on the one hand, if we want
to test a psychological sentence about someone else, we have to rely on the physical state
of that person and the behaviour he displays, but on the other, we do not need to apply
this indirect procedure in some cases involving the testing of a psychological sentence
about our own mind.24 Carnap elaborates these observations in his article Les concepts
psychologiques et les concepts physiques sont-ils foncie`rement diﬀe´rents? (1935), making
use of the following example.25
Let us use angryw to refer to the mental state of anger, the feeling of anger, or the state
of consciousness called anger, and use angryu to refer to the class of physical states
known from experience in which a persons body is if and only if that person is angryw.
Consider the following sentences:
p Miss A is angryw now.
q Miss A is angryu now.
r A person is angryw at time-point t if and only if this person is angryu at time-point t.
Carnap claims that his deﬁnition of the notion angryu implies that r is a true empirical
law.26 Let C = {p1, . . . ,pn} be the set of protocol sentences that can be deduced from q.
For Miss A, the content of the system sentence p consists of the set of protocol sentences
which are deducible from p: that is, in the ﬁrst place, the sentence p itself (as Miss A can
assess the truth of sentence p immediately through introspection, p for her is a protocol
sentence27), but also the set C of protocol sentences that can be inferred from q—even
though this indirect veriﬁcation procedure may be somewhat unusual for Miss A—because












spellinIn this case, p and the sentences in the set C are for A protocol sentences [e´nonce´s de
controˆle] of p. Indeed, ﬁrst, A can verify the the sentence p directly (by introspection,
as one would say); and second, [she] can verify it indirectly as well, although [she]ittle further on, Feigl argues: [t]hat peculiar ‘‘plus,’’ that ‘‘something more’’ which, it appeared, is needed
er to endow . . . ‘‘mere bodily behavior’’ with psychological relevance is factually meaningless (Feigl, 1934,
), and [e]xperience which is in every respect ‘‘as if’’ it were dependent upon an apprehension of a
endent reality is strictly identical with an experience which is ‘‘really’’ so. Similarly, an organism behaving
y way ‘‘as if it had a mental life’’ is simply identical with what we can possibly mean by an organism
’’ having mental life (Feigl, 1934, p. 426). Cf. Haller (1993), p. 194. See also Hempel (1949 [1935]), p. 379,
member the Turing test.
Carnap (1937), pp. 10–11.
Carnap (1935), pp. 45–47.
er remarks: [h]ow Carnap knows that this empirical generalization is true he does not say. Neither does he
the philosophical diﬃculties which arise when one considers how it might be proved (Ayer, 1963, p. 272).
te that Carnap usually distinguishes between system sentences and protocol sentences, even when their
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tion. (Carnap, 1935, p. 47—quote adapted to the present situation)In short, for Miss A, the content of p consists of {p,p1, . . . ,pn}. Conversely, the content of
the system sentence q for Miss A does not only consist of C, but also of p, because p for her
is a protocol sentence and because p follows logically from q and r. So for Miss A, the con-
tents of p and q are identical and are equal to {p,p1, . . . ,pn}.
For someone else, for example for Mr B, p is not a protocol sentence, because Mr B has
no direct access to Miss As mind: [t]he sentence [p] is not directly veriﬁable by B; hence it
is not a protocol sentence [e´nonce´ de controˆle], although it is indirectly veriﬁable (ibid.).
For the veriﬁcation of sentence p, Mr B has to rely on the set of protocol sentences
C = {p1, . . . ,pn}. Hence, for Mr B the content of p consists only of {p1, . . . ,pn}, because
{p1, . . . ,pn} is the set of protocol sentences that can be inferred from q and because q fol-
lows from p and r. The same holds for the content of q for Mr B: p is not a protocol sen-
tence for Mr B, so for him the content of q only consists of {p1, . . . ,pn}. Hence, for Mr B
the contents of p and q are identical and are equal to {p1, . . . ,pn}. Therefore, for Miss A
and Mr B the contents of the sentences p and q are identical, even though their content for
Miss A is not the same as their content for Mr B.28 The diﬀerence, Carnap writes, only
consists in that the sentence [p] is directly and indirectly veriﬁable by A, whereas it is only
indirectly veriﬁable by B (ibid.).
In short, Carnap used his subject-dependent protocol languages so that he could save
introspection within his physicalistic framework as an autonomous and independent
method of veriﬁcation for sentences about ones own mind. In the long run, however, this
inventive solution would not survive the outcome of the debate on protocol sentences.
2.1.3. The debate on protocol sentences
At the time when the members of the Vienna Circle developed their logical behaviour-
ism, they also debated about the truth and meaning of protocol sentences. In their view,
protocol sentences formed the basis of all empirical knowledge: they reduced the truth and
meaning of each system sentence p to the truth and meaning of protocol sentences that
could be derived from p. Though, in their manifesto of 1929, Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath
agreed that protocol sentences served to articulate the given,29 they would later cross
swords over the nature of the exact relation between protocol sentences and the given.
Carnap preferred to ground protocol sentences in a phenomenally given, to be obtained
via introspection. Neurath had serious reservations about the methodical solipsism cham-
pioned by Carnap and about Carnaps corresponding interpretation of protocol sentenceseems that here, Carnap commits himself to a somewhat hybrid position with regard to protocol sentences:
one hand there are purely subjective protocol sentences, and on the other hand intersubjective (objective?)
ol sentences. This hybrid position might be related to Fechners theory of psychophysical parallelism: [t]he
suggests that each human being has double access to, or has two perspectives of, himself: When I am aware
elf in a way in which no one else can be aware of me, I am aware of mental processes. When I am aware of
in a way in which other persons can also perceive me (for example, when I see myself in a mirror), then I
e same processes in a physical, objective form; I appear to myself as a physical, material being
lberger, 2003, p. 238). See Carnap (1967 [1928]), §§ 166–169.
rnap, Hahn, and Neurath wrote: Since the meaning of every statement of science must be statable by
ion to a statement about the given, likewise the meaning of every concept, whatever branch of science it
long to, must be statable by step-wise reduction to other concepts, down to the concepts of the lowest level
refer directly to the given (Carnap, Hahn, & Neurath, 1973 [1929], p. 309).
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for all the remaining statements of science (Carnap, 1995 [1931], p. 45).30 According to
Neurath, this methodological position implies that the supposedly infallible foundation
of all science eludes any attempt at intersubjective testing. Neurath rejected this method-
ological position31—and with that the entire notion of subject-dependent protocol lan-
guages—and instead argued for the assumption of a single intersubjective language, a














(1935)It is the physicalist language, uniﬁed language, that all science is about [das Um und
Auf aller Wissenschaft]: no phenomenal language beside the physical language; no
methodical solipsism beside another possible standpoint . . . ; only uniﬁed science
with its laws and predictions. (Neurath, 1983c [1931], p. 68)Even though Carnap did give in to Neuraths arguments, he initially still tried to reconcile
both parties—phenomenalists and physicalists—by trying to show that this is a question,
not of mutually inconsistent views, but rather of two diﬀerent methods for structuring the
language of science both of which are possible and legitimate (Carnap, 1987 [1932], p. 457).
Finally, but gradually, Neurath managed to convince Carnap to completely abandon his
phenomenalistic interpretation of the basis of our knowledge. To begin, Carnap replaced,
in his Testability and meaning (1936 and 1937), his multitude of subject-dependent pro-
tocol languages with one single intersubjective thing-language—a more secure basis for
truth and knowledge.32 The content of every system sentence is now assessed in relation
to this unique intersubjective thing-language. Thus, the cognitive meaning of system sen-
tences is no longer subject-dependent, as Carnap erroneously stated earlier, but subject-
independent, and thus more or less objective. The relations between psychological and
physicalistic sentences suﬀer a similar fate, as Carnap assesses the relations between these
system sentences through their cognitive meaning. If subsequently Carnaps famous dis-
tinction between the material and the formal mode of speech is disregarded, an identity
theory in the vein of Feigl is within reach.33 Indeed, Feigl uses the results of the debate
on protocol sentences in an attempt to reconstruct logical behaviourism into a philosophy
of psychology in which the notion of subject-dependent protocol languages no longer
plays a part and in which therefore introspection no longer ranks as an autonomous
and independent method of veriﬁcation for statements about ones own mind:mpare Carnap (1987 [1932]), p. 463.
urath attacks this position mainly with sceptical arguments, though as early as 1934, he comes close to
rs thesis of the theory-ladenness of perception: [i]f one considers that in protocol statements . . . terms of
tion occur that are highly imprecise, that furthermore the content of protocol statements depends on the
ion of these terms in the competent sciences, the ambiguity will not surprise us from the start (Neurath,
[1934], p. 106).
wever, in Testability and meaning, Carnap still sticks to the possibility of interpreting psychological
ates phenomenalistically: the distinction between (1) sentences about other minds and (2) sentences about
wn mind reappears as the diﬀerence between respectively a physicalistic and a phenomenalistic usage or
etation of psychological predicates.
his Logical positivism and the mind–body problem, Kim concludes that we ﬁnd in Carnap . . . a form of
alism that anticipates important later developments, in particular, functionalism and psychoneural identity
based on the functionalist approach (Kim, 2003, p. 277). Cirera remarks that Carnaps philosophy of
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the physical world . . . is not a matter of belief or Weltanschauung (dogmatic mon-
ism) but a truth capable of logical demonstration. In other words, the Duality of
Mind and Matter does not imply two realities, or two aspects of reality, but is
merely a duality of languages or conceptual systems. (Feigl, 1934, pp. 420–421)2.2. Time present and time future
Suppose that a critic of logical behaviourism raises the familiar objection that Miss A,
through introspection, can know that she is angry, while for other observers remaining
apparently unmoved. Evidently, the sentence Miss A is angryw can be accepted by Miss
A and rejected by all others. Must we not, then, reject Carnaps claim that every psycho-
logical sentence can be translated into a physicalist sentence? Carnaps answer would be
negative. First, he could point to the fact that although mutual translatability implies
intersubjective meaningfulness, it does not imply intersubjective validity. Hence, in the
example discussed earlier, ﬁguring Miss A and Mr B, the sentence Miss A is angryw
and its physicalist translation Miss A is angryu are intersubjectively meaningful, but in
the situation sketched by the critic they are not intersubjectively valid, since both sentences
are accepted by Miss A and rejected by all others. This reply ﬁts in with Carnaps analysis
of the content of system sentences in terms of sets of subject-dependent protocol sentences.
However, this cannot be the whole story. If it were, it would commit Carnap to the awk-
ward position that there are some psychological statements that can be known to be true
by a one person only. This would show his programme of physicalizing psychology to be
fundamentally ﬂawed.34 Carnap explicitly denies such a position: every reasonable man, if
not corrupted by philosophy, understands that these two statements [to wit, Miss A is not
angryw now and Miss A is angryu now] contradict each other, and that, as a conse-
quence, it is impossible that they both are true at the same time (Carnap, 1935, p. 52).
There is a second and more promising line of argument to counter the critics objection:
[o]ur ignorance of physiology can . . . aﬀect only the mode of our characterization of the
physical state of aﬀairs in question. It in no way touches upon the principal point: that
sentence p refers to a physical state of aﬀairs (Carnap, 1959a [1932], pp. 175–176). At pres-
ent, so Carnap claims, we can indeed ﬁnd a physicalist translation q for every psycholog-
ical sentence p, such that for every subject S it holds that the content which p has for S is
identical to the content which q has for S. As long as diﬀerent subjects attach diﬀerent sets
of protocol sentences to p (and, hence, to q), it still remains possible that one and the same
system sentence has diﬀerent truth-values for diﬀerent subjects. However, the more exper-
imental-psychological research enables us to assess the necessary and suﬃcient truth con-
ditions for the predicate x is angryu, the more the subject-dependent contents will
coincide and, hence, the less diﬀerences of opinion there will be. Finally, when experimen-
tal research will have provided us with the exact conditions for angeru referring to facialmpare Carnap (1987 [1932]), p. 468. In this passage, Carnap reformulates the asymmetry between
tion procedures for sentences about other minds and those for sentences about ones own mind by giving a
alist translation of the sentence stating the asymmetry: ‘‘Only S is immediately aware of his hunger’’
: ‘‘Only S is able to make the statement S is hungry directly on the basis of hunger, i.e., with no physical
connection with processes outside of Ss body’’ (Carnap, 1987 [1932], p. 368). Note that this physicalist
tion does not rule out the situation sketched by our critic.
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etc.,35 the physicalization of our psychological concept is complete. As physical determi-
nations are valid intersubjectively (Carnap, 1995 [1931], p. 65), we will then be able to ex-
pose every (conscious or unconscious) impostor. The previous discussion shows that
Carnap is committed to the incorporation of micro-physiological processes in his philos-
ophy of psychology. A logical behaviourism conﬁning itself to overt, publicly observable
behaviour would, as we have argued, seriously compromise physicalism.
Carnap envisages the search for a physicalistic sentence q with the same cognitive con-
tent as the given psychological sentence p roughly as follows: (1) We deﬁne q1 as the sen-
tence The state of Miss As body is part of the class of physical states K, K being the
currently known class of physical states in which Miss A ﬁnds herself if and only if she
is angryw. Because q1 only contains physicalistic predicates, it is a physicalistic sentence.
Moreover, q1 has by deﬁnition the same cognitive content as p, as q1 reﬂects the current
state of our psychological knowledge. (2) Ongoing psychological research into the class
of physical states in which Miss As body is if and only if Miss A is angryw, may require
us to adjust q1 to this new state of psychological knowledge. This adjustment will result in
a more accurate sentence q2. Hence, given this new state of knowledge, there still is a phys-
icalistic sentence with exactly the same cognitive content as p. (Note that the content of p
not only depends on logic and the laws of nature, but on a suﬃciently large set of already
accepted sentences as well. It is plausible that the new state of knowledge necessitates alter-
ations in this set of sentences or in the laws of nature, thereby changing the content of p.)
By carefully following this procedure, we will ﬁnally ﬁnd a sentence qn that exactly states
the necessary and suﬃcient physical conditions for p: the physicalization of p has been
completed. Let us now take a closer look at these two points.
Ad (1). If Carnap is to be believed, it would already in the 1930s have been possible to
ﬁnd for every psychological sentence p a physicalistic sentence q with exactly the same cog-








the facEven today every sentence of psychology can be translated into a sentence which
refers to the physical behavior of living creatures. In such a physical characterization
terms do indeed occur which have not yet been physicalized, i.e. reduced to the con-
cepts of physical science. Nevertheless, the concepts used are physical concepts,
though of a primitive sort. (Carnap, 1959a [1932], p. 183)36Apparently, Carnap is enough of a pragmatist not to insist on deﬁnitions that will attain
unscathed the end of times. He simply claims that it is already possible to state—for the
time being—adequate deﬁnitions of psychological terms using primitive physicalistic
terms: [w]e maintain that these deﬁnitions can be produced, since, implicitly, they alreadyrnap (1935), p. 45.
also Carnap (1959a [1932]), p. 175. Hempel and Schlick maintain more or less the same thing. Hempel
In order for logical behaviorism to be acceptable, it is not necessary that we be able to describe the
al state of a human body which is referred to by a certain psychological statement . . . down to the most
details of the phenomena of the central nervous system (Hempel, 1949 [1935], p. 381). Schlick writes: we
t need to consider the events in the nervous system—which are for the most part unknown—for it is
nt to pay attention to his expression, his utterances, his whole deportment. In these processes . . . we have
ts by which feelings are expressible in the physical language (Schlick, 1949 [1935], p. 402).
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knowledge, all proposals for such deﬁnitions are simply either accurate or inaccurate.38
It is true that the present (incomplete) knowledge of psychology does not yet allow for
an exhaustive characterization of psychological terms in terms of neurophysiological states
of, for example, Miss A. That, however, is no reason to deny our psychological sentences
any content; Carnap argues that, for the time being, we will have to settle for a character-
ization of their content in terms of the information that is presently available about bodily
movements, facial expressions and linguistic utterances—in short, the behavioural dispo-
sitions—of Miss A. This characterization is provisional and will, of course, be much less
precise than the ﬁnal characterization, which will incorporate all information about the
neurophysiological states of Miss A which are not yet available. Ultimately, scientiﬁc re-
search will enable us to replace all our present primitive, intuitive concept formations by
(constructions of) physicalistic state quantities, just as has already happened with former
pre-theoretical proto-physicalistic concepts such as warm and green.39
Ad (2). Advancements in empirical research will force us to continually adapt the phys-
icalistic sentence q to the latest state of knowledge. However, it is rather impractical to re-
state sentence q after each signiﬁcant advancement in the relevant sciences: [i]f we now
were to state a deﬁnition, we should have to revoke it at a new stage of the development
of science, and to state a new deﬁnition, incompatible with the ﬁrst one (Carnap, 1936, p.
449). As Carnap shows in a famous analysis, such adjustments of what was already known
about the physicalistic content of the psychological sentence p should be seen as additions
rather than as corrections.
The starting point of this analysis is Carnaps claim that all current psychological prop-
erties are dispositions.40 It is well-known that a disposition term Q(x) (for example, x is
soluble in water) cannot simply be deﬁned as R1(x)! R2(x) (If x is put in water, then x
will dissolve).41 In Testability and meaning, Carnap develops a logical instrument—the
reduction sentence—to deal with disposition terms more adequately. A reduction sentence
for our disposition term Q(x) is:
R1ðxÞ ! ½R2ðxÞ ! QðxÞ
Unlike the deﬁnition of Q(x) as R1(x)! R2(x), this reduction sentence does not tell us
anything about the truth value of Q(x) in cases in which :R1(x) holds. Opposing his
1932 defense of the explicit deﬁnability of psychological concepts and the corresponding37 Cf. Carnap (1995 [1931]), pp. 85–86.
38 von Kutschera rightly remarks: Carnap [claims] that psychological terms are explicitly deﬁnable in physical
terms. These deﬁnitions cannot be nominal deﬁnitions, in which the deﬁniendum is a novel expression getting
meaning only via the deﬁnition, as psychological expressions already do have a meaning. Hence, in opposition to
nominal deﬁnitions, the deﬁnitions considered here are not stipulations, but they are right or wrong (von
Kutschera, 1991, p. 307).
39 Cirera argues that [Carnaps] words suggest that neurophysiological reduction would be the most suitable;
and that behavioural reduction . . . is no more than a consolation prize, a purely provisional resource, given our
cognitive limits (Cirera, 1993, p. 356). Kim writes that Carnap claims that as our knowledge of neurophysiology
grows . . . , the behavioral deﬁnitions of psychological properties and states will give way to physiological
deﬁnitions (Kim, 2003, p. 275).
40 Carnap asserts: Every psychological property is marked out as a disposition to behave in a certain way
(Carnap, 1959a [1932], p. 186).
41 The material implication is the culprit. In fact, for all objects that have not been put in water, the deﬁniens is
true, and therefore so is the deﬁniendum.
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that we analyse the speciﬁcation of the meaning of the disposition term Q(x) by means of




translaSuppose that we introduce a predicate Q into the language of science ﬁrst by a
reduction pair and that, later on, step by step, we add more such pairs for Q as
our knowledge about Q increases with further experimental investigations. In the
course of this procedure the range of indeterminateness for Q, i.e. the class of cases
for which we have not yet given a meaning to Q, becomes smaller and smaller. (Car-
nap, 1936, p. 448)
Only if we reach, by adding more and more reduction pairs, a stage in which all cases
are determined, may we go over to the form of a deﬁnition. (Ibid. p. 450)In short, a physicalist deﬁnition of a psychological predicate is untenable as long as devel-
opments in the relevant sciences have not yet yielded all the required reduction pairs.
Hence, Carnap considerably nuances his original translation programme for psychology
with the introduction of reduction sentences. This conceptual tool enables Carnap also
to better answer the objection raised at the beginning of this section. Armed with his reduc-
tion sentences, Carnap can now grant that our current state of psychological knowledge
does not warrant physicalist deﬁnitions of psychological terms. New results from empiri-
cal-psychological research can now, in the form of reduction sentences, smoothly be incor-
porated in our previous body of partial physicalizations of psychological sentences. Earlier
ﬁndings concerning relations between psychological sentences and sentences describing
overt, generally accessible behaviour can simply be retained. In Carnaps new theoretical
account of scientiﬁc progress in psychology, deﬁnitions of psychological terms hardly play
a role: if deﬁnitions of psychological terms are not relegated to the realm of fantasy, then to
a Peircean ﬁnal opinion in some distant future.42
3. Conclusion
Carnaps logical behaviourism takes into account both the current state of knowledge
and a ﬁnal opinion in the distant future. His philosophical psychology allows for three
physicalistic research programmes: two static programmes and one dynamic programme.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century a dynamic conception of science in all its
diversity has become generally accepted. Nevertheless, traditional epistemology, with its
static ideal of knowledge, in which necessity is still conceived as a characteristic of truth,
largely dominated this centurys philosophy of mind. It is little wonder then, that twenti-
eth-century philosophy of mind has focused its attention mainly on both static
programmes.
With the ﬁrst static programme, one may try to show that even nowadays, each psycho-
logical sentence can already be reduced to a set of sentences describing the subjects overt,rnap remarks: The so-called thesis of Physicalism asserts that every term of the language of science—
ing beside the physical language those sub-languages which are used in biology, in psychology, and in social
—is reducible to terms of the physical language. Here a remark . . . has to be made. We may assert
bility of the terms, but not—as was done in our former publications—deﬁnability of the terms and hence
tability of the sentences (Carnap, 1936, p. 467).
664 A. Tamminga / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 36 (2005) 649–666generally accessible behaviour, instead of his or her neurophysiological states. Ryle, Quine
and Dennett are more recent representatives of this philosophical school.
In the second static programme, which has been crucial for twentieth-century philoso-
phy of mind, the central question is how psychological and physicalistic sentences—or, in
the material mode of speech, how psychological and physicalistic phenomena—will relate
to each other once we have at our disposal perfect and complete physicalistic theories with
which to explain and predict behaviour. Almost everyone works within this second re-
search programme, whatever position they take up in the debate on reductionism, func-
tionalism or eliminativism.
On the other hand, the dynamic research programme couples full awareness of the
changeability of scientiﬁc knowledge with the aim to develop a philosophy of psychology
that does justice to this changeability. Over the last twenty years, Nagels standard account
of reduction of completed and axiomatized theories has been replaced by accounts of
reduction of changing and provisional theories.43 As we have seen, Carnap already de-
fends a comparable dynamic programme in the 1930s.44 Within the overall framework
of physicalism, he constructed a set of conceptual tools to make intelligible the permanent
revision of physicalist interpretations of psychological terms on the basis of the latest sci-
entiﬁc developments.45 At the same time, Carnap attempted to retain introspection as an
independent source of knowledge. This latter attempt ultimately ran aground on the out-
come of the debate on protocol sentences, with which the ﬁrst-person perspective disap-
peared beneath the horizon of logical behaviourism. Out of sight, out of mind?
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